Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although it should provide development opportunities, renewed oil interest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) represents a real threat to stability in a still vulnerable post-conflict country. Exploration has begun, but oil prospecting is nurturing old resentments among local communities and contributing to border tensions with neighbouring countries. If oil reserves are confirmed in the east, this would exacerbate deep-rooted conflict dynamics in the Kivus. An upsurge in fighting since the start of 2012, including the emergence of a new rebellion in North Kivu and the resumption of armed groups’ territorial expansion, has further complicated stability in the east, which is the new focus for oil exploration. New oil reserves could also create new centres of power and question Katanga’s (DRC’s traditional economic hub) political influence. Preventive action is needed to turn a real threat to stability into a genuine development opportunity.

Potential oil reserves straddle the country’s borders with Uganda, Angola and possibly other countries and could rekindle old sensitivities once exploration commences. In the context of a general oil rush in Central and East Africa, the lack of clearly defined borders, especially in the Great Lakes region, poses significant risk for maintaining regional stability.

Clashes between the Congolese and Ugandan armies in 2007 led to the Ngurdoto Accords establishing a system for regulating border oil problems, but Kinshasa’s reluctance to implement this agreement and the collapse of the Ugandan-Congolese dialogue threaten future relations between the two countries. In the west, failure to find an amicable solution to an Angolan-Congolese dispute about offshore concessions has worsened relations between the two countries and led to the violent expulsion from Angola of Congolese nationals. Instead of investing in the resolution of border conflicts with its neighbours before beginning oil exploration, the Congolese government is ignoring the problem, failing to dialogue with Uganda and officially claiming an extension of its maritime borders with Angola.

The abduction in 2011 of an oil employee in the Virunga Park, in the Kivus, is a reminder that exploration is taking place in disputed areas where ethnic groups are competing for territorial control and the army and militias are engaged in years of illegally exploiting natural resources. Given that the Kivus are high-risk areas, oil discovery could aggravate the conflict. Moreover, confirmation of oil reserves in the Central Basin and the east could feed secessionist tendencies in a context of failed decentralisation and financial discontent between the central government and the provinces.

Poor governance has been the hallmark of the oil sector since exploration resumed in the east and west of the country. Even with only one producing oil company, the black gold is the main source of government revenue and yet, with exploration in full swing, oil sector reform is very slow. Instead of creating clear procedures, a transparent legal framework and robust institutions, previous governments have behaved like speculators, in a way that is reminiscent of practices in the mining sector. Reflecting the very degraded business climate, they have allocated and reallocated concessions and often acted without considering the needs of the local people and international commitments, especially regarding environmental protection.

The official division of exploration blocks includes natural parks, some of which are World Heritage Sites. It also directly threatens the resources of local populations in some areas. Initiatives to promote financial and contractual transparency are contradicted by the lack of transparency in allocating concessions. The state’s failure to adequately regulate the diverging and potentially conflicting interests of companies and poor communities is clearly causing local resentment, which could easily flare up into local violence that could be manipulated.

In a context of massive poverty, weak state, poor governance and regional insecurity, an oil rush will have a strong destabilising effect unless the government adopts several significant steps regionally and nationally to avert such a devastating scenario. Regionally, it should draw on the close support of the African Union (AU) and the World Bank Group to design a management model for cross-border reserves and help facilitate a border demarcation program. Nationally, the government should implement oil sector reform, declare a moratorium on the exploration of insecure areas, especially in the east where the situation is again deteriorating, until these territories are made secure, and involve the provinces in the main management decisions concerning this resource.

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Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed

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OVERVIEWSince Bosco Ntaganda’s mutiny in April 2012 and the subsequent creation of the 23 March rebel movement (M23), violence has returned to the Kivus. However today’s crisis bears the same hallmarks as yesterday’s, a consequence of the failure to implement the 2008 framework for resolution of the conflict. Rather than effectively implementing the 23 March 2009 peace agreement signed by the government and the CNDP (National Council for the Defence of the People), the Congolese authorities have instead only feigned the integration of the CNDP into political institutions, and likewise the group appears to have only pretended to integrate into the Congolese army. Furthermore in the absence of the agreed army reform, military pressure on armed groups had only a temporary effect and, more­over, post-conflict reconstruction has not been accompanied by essential governance reforms and political dialogue. To move away from crisis management and truly resolve this two-decade-old conflict, donors should put pressure on both Kigali and Kinshasa.

The M23 is behaving in a similar fashion to previous rebel movements by creating its own administration and its own financing system in parts of North Kivu. Meanwhile, Mai-Mai groups are expanding in rural areas where they commit atrocities that exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions. In July this year, in accordance with the peace and security architecture, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) organised a regional dialogue to avoid conflict between Rwanda and the DRC. Unfortunately, the outcome of this was an unrealistic and ineffective solution: the deployment of a 4,000-strong neutral force at the border between Rwanda and the DRC. If international donors and African mediators persist in managing the crisis rather than solving it, it will be impossible to avoid such repetitive cycles of rebellions in the Kivus and the risk of large-scale violence will remain. Instead, to finally resolve this conflict, it is essential that Rwanda ends its involvement in Congolese affairs and that the reconstruction plan and the political agreements signed in the Kivus are properly implemented. For these things to happen Western donors should maintain aid suspension against Rwanda until the release of the next report of the UN group of experts, in addition to issuing a clear warning to the Congolese authorities that they will not provide funding for stabilisation and institutional support until the government improves political dialogue and governance in both the administration and in the army in the east, as recommended by Crisis Group on several previous occasions.

In the short term, this crisis can be dealt with through the following initiatives:

the negotiation and monitoring of a ceasefire between the Congolese authorities and the M23 by the UN;the reactivation of an effective and permanent joint verification mechanism for the DRC and Rwandan border, as envisaged by the ICGLR, which should be provided with the necessary technical and human resources;the addition of the individuals and entities that supported the M23 and other armed groups to the UN sanctions list and the consideration of an embargo on weapons sales to Rwanda;the joint evaluation of the 23 March 2009 agreement in the framework of the international follow-up committee it established and this assessment should be the basis for resumption of dialogue between the government and the CNDP;the launch of local peace initiatives in Walikale, Masisi, Shabunda and Kalehe areas where ethnic tension is high by MONUSCO and the government;the arrest and handover of Bosco Ntaganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC); andthe launch of an investigation by the ICC into the actions of M23 and new armed groups, and the request by the ICC that MONUSCO transfer to it its files concerning M23 leaders.

After analysing the failure of the stabilisation of the Kivus in the report Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda, this new Crisis Group briefing explains the surge of violence and underlines that the Kivus do not need a new strategic approach; rather, the peace agreements and stabilisation plans should no longer remain empty promises. To achieve this, coordinated and unequivocal pressure is required from the donors that help fund the Rwandan and Congolese regimes.

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Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the institutions are functioning and the government has been priding itself on its development and security achievements, Burundi is regressing. Due to the 2010 electoral impasse, the Arusha agreement has been replaced by a de facto one-party system characterised by the end of dialogue between the opposition and the ruling party, the government’s authoritarian drift and the resumption of political violence. Respect for the political minorities and rule of law has been largely ignored since 2010. To ensure lasting stability, the political actors should resume dialogue, guarantee pluralism for the 2015 elections and support a consensual transitional justice process. Given that they sponsor peacebuilding efforts, provide a significant amount of aid to Burundi and in the absence of other donors, the current international partners should focus on these issues while discussing with the government.

The dust has not yet settled since the 2010 elections. After boycotting the electoral process, the opposition parties formed a coalition (the Democratic Alliance for Change, ADC-Ikibiri) and several opposition leaders went into exile. A wave of mutual violence by the opposition and the ruling party (the National Council for the Defence of Democracy and the Forces for the Defence of Democracy, CNDD-FDD) ensued. Challenged by armed groups and criticised by civil society, the government has resorted to repression and intimidation.

The control of the institutions by the ruling party and the absence of a genuine opposition made the power-sharing system defined by the Arusha agreement irrelevant. The ruling party is managing state business and the transitional justice process as it wishes. In addition, it is instrumentalising the security services and is preparing a constitutional change behind closed doors. Today, the only checks and balances are the media and civil society.

However, there is a window of opportunity. On the one hand, socio-economic problems, rising social discontent and extrajudicial killings put severe strains on the government. On the other hand, parallel dialogues have recently started between the European Union and the Burundian government and between Burundian political actors. From 28 May to 2 June 2012, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Initiatives and Change hosted a meeting in Switzerland with representatives of most of the opposition parties, civil society leaders and two members of the ruling party.

Continuing these parallel dialogues and consolidating peace in Burundi will require mutual concessions by the ruling party and the opposition. It will also require that the donors maintain dialogue with the authorities on the political and security problems and resort to financial incentives, particularly for the preparation of the elections and the security sector reform. International efforts should focus on protecting journalists and civil society activists, empowering the independent human rights commission and promoting a security sector reform centred on human rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government and the Opposition of Burundi:

1.  Initiate quickly inclusive talks as a follow-up to the Switzerland meeting and focusing on the return of the opposition leaders, the respect of political freedom, the legal framework for the 2015 elections and the issue of political detainees.

To the Opposition:

2.  Condemn publicly political violence and stop questioning the legitimacy of the 2010 elections.

To the Government:

3.  Ensure political pluralism ahead of the 2015 elections by:

a) reviewing laws and bills about political parties, media and demonstrations and public gatherings that may limit political competition and freedom of speech;

b) making sure that the leadership of the new electoral commission is designated following a consensus among the entire Burundian political class; and

c) organising a public debate about the eligibility of the current president.

4.  Establish a tripartite committee (government officials, civil society representatives and foreign partners), following the conclusions of the nationwide consultations on transitional justice, to review the bill on the truth and reconciliation commission; and ensure that the elections timetable does not collide with that of the commission.

5.  Establish a constitutional review committee composed of civil society representatives, politicians from all sides and, if needed, international experts.

To Civil Society and the Media:

6.  Create a warning system and a legal assistance fund in case of threats and prosecutions against journalists and civil society activists.

To the International Community and, in particular, the U.S., the UN office in Burundi and the European Union (and all the European countries represented in Bujumbura):

7.  Defend press freedom by:

a) supporting publicly the abolition of press offences during the public debate related to the new draft bill on the media;

b) providing technical and financial support for the nationwide extension of media coverage and offering training programs for the Burundian media; and

c) promoting quality work in the media through awards for the best journalists.

8.  Organise a roundtable with the ruling party and the main opposition parties in order to define a consensual roadmap for the 2015 elections.

9.  Support the warning system and contribute to the legal assistance fund to respond to threats and prosecutions against journalists and civil society activists.

10.  Support the legal assistance program of the independent human rights commission and provide training for its personnel.

11.  Focus the security sector reform (SSR) on human rights by:

a) using human rights indicators in the assessment methodology of the reform;

b) prioritising support for effective internal and external checks and balances in SSR programs; and

c) ensure financial support for the SSR is commensurate with progress on human rights and democratic control of the security services.

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The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Within a decade, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most dangerous maritime areas in the world. Maritime insecurity is a major regional problem that is compromising the development of this strategic economic area and threatening maritime trade in the short term and the stability of coastal states in the long term. Initially taken by surprise, the region’s governments are now aware of the problem and the UN is organising a summit meeting on the issue. In order to avoid violent transnational crime destabilising the maritime economy and coastal states, as it has done on the East African coast, these states must fill the security vacuum in their territorial waters and provide a collective response to this danger. Gulf of Guinea countries must press for dynamic cooperation between the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), take the initiative in promoting security and adopt a new approach based on improving not only security but also economic governance.

The recent discovery of offshore hydrocarbon deposits has increased the geostrategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea. After long neglecting their maritime zones, Gulf of Guinea states are now aware of their weakness. On the international front, renewed Western interest in the region is accompanied by similar interest from emerging nations. In this context, the rise in maritime crime has increased collective concern in a region where, for decades, the problems of sovereignty and territorial control have only been posed on dry land.

The Niger delta region in Nigeria was the initial epicentre of maritime crime. For decades, oil production has paradoxically created poverty. As social tensions and environmental pollution increased, oil income has, in large part, only benefited central government, oil companies and local elites. Those excluded from the system turned to violent opposition. Forced to bypass the state to gain access to even a fraction of this wealth, they have organised illegal activities, including siphoning off crude oil, clandestine refining and illegal trade in fuel. The constant increase in the value of the industry has allowed these activities to prosper and economic crime to spread.

The weakness and general inadequacy of the maritime policies of Gulf of Guinea states and the lack of cooperation between them have allowed criminal networks to diversify their activities and gradually extend them away from the Nigerian coast and out on to the high seas. Crime does not affect only the oil industry; it has diversified to include piracy and increasingly audacious and well-planned sea-borne raids. Criminal groups have learned quickly and appeared along the coasts of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipé, Benin and Togo, taking advantage of troubled socio-political situations.

Having recovered from the initial surprise, Gulf of Guinea states and Western countries are exploring how best to deal with the problem before it causes wider instability. States and regional organisations have launched specific operations and are formulating strategies to improve security. Those states most affected aim to build navies and increase resources for coastal policing in the hope of deterring criminals.

At the regional level, within the framework of its peace and security polices, ECCAS has created a regional maritime security centre and organised joint training exercises. However, states do not find it straightforward to organise joint funding or coordinate their efforts. Maritime policies are embryonic and symbolic and states are unable to maintain a continuous presence at sea. In the case of ECOWAS, maritime cooperation is still in its infancy and is hampered by political tensions and distrust of neighbouring states toward Nigeria.

At the inter-regional level, cooperation between ECCAS and ECOWAS would allow regional patrols to exercise the right of pursuit beyond maritime borders. However, inter-regional discussions have only just begun and political tensions hamper efforts to promote practical cooperation. Meanwhile, Western powers (U.S., France, U.K.) and emerging nations (Brazil, China, India, South Africa) with economic interests in the region are providing financial support and security expertise to assist local initiatives. 

The institutionalisation of regional cooperation and the increase in the number of international initiatives must not obscure the fact that rising crime in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly due to poor governance. Most states in the region have been unable to control economic activities in their maritime zones and in international waters and ensure the development of their coasts. This collective failure has created a major opportunity for criminal networks that feed on the needs and resentments of local communities. A range of urgent measures is needed to reverse this trend: reforms to improve governance of the economy and security sector, comprehensive and effective maritime public policies and practical regional cooperation beyond declarations of intent. A long-term response is needed because, although piracy is a recent phenomenon in the region, its root causes are much deeper.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Governments of the Gulf of Guinea States (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipé, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola):

1.  Prioritise the fight against maritime crime by creating an inter-ministerial committee in each country to draw up a national maritime strategy to tackle the immediate threat and the root causes of the problem. These committees should include at least the ministers of social affairs, foreign affairs, defence, interior, transport, economy, labour, fishing and natural resources.

To combat the root causes of maritime crime

2.  Combat crime in the hydrocarbons and shipping sectors by conducting research into the illegal trade in fuel in order to identify the companies involved in illegal activities.

3.  Boost job creation along the coast, in particular by protecting artisanal fishing, stimulating the local fish processing industry, providing professional training for vulnerable sectors of the population (former combatants and unemployed youth) and reinvesting assets seized from fuel smugglers in development projects.

4.  Strengthen maritime law enforcement through professionalisation of naval forces, maritime law enforcement bodies and port authorities, which should increase their technological capacity and intelligence networks to monitor all activity in their exclusive economic zones.

To strengthen anti-piracy policies at sea and on land

5.  Maintain navy patrols in mooring zones and territorial waters day and night and carry out regular surveillance flights.

6.  Work closely with the UN’s International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and shipping industry to draw up best management practices advising ship owners, captains and crews on anti-piracy measures.

7.  Set up a national inter-agency anti-piracy task force to investigate, arrest and prosecute pirate gangs on land and at sea.

8.  Accede to all necessary international legal instruments including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, integrate these conventions into national law and train personnel responsible for implementing them, especially in the judicial system.

To strengthen cooperation

9.  Sign bilateral agreements at the presidential level between direct neighbours to facilitate extraditions and enable close cooperation between navies, maritime administration agencies and police forces in counter-piracy work.

10.  Organise in the near future joint surveillance operations in especially dangerous zones:

a) Nigeria, Benin and Togo should agree to expand the joint Operation Prosperity to include Togo’s territorial waters;

b) Nigeria and Cameroon should conduct joint patrols on their maritime borders.

11.  Participate fully in efforts by ECCAS and ECOWAS to draw up a regional maritime security strategy and share resources.

12.  Strengthen inter-regional cooperation by:

a) organising a Gulf of Guinea summit at which heads of state should sign the Memorandum of Understanding between ECCAS and ECOWAS on Maritime Security in the Central and Western Maritime Region and the Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa; and

b) making the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) to be set up in Ghana an information collection and dissemination tool for the Gulf of Guinea and transforming the regional training service for maritime security planned by ECCAS into a training centre for the whole region.

To International Partners:

13.  Coordinate international support through a multinational maritime affairs committee for each country and ensure that foreign interventions are aligned with national strategies.

14.  Assist national maritime affairs committees in designing comprehensive maritime policies that address the immediate threat and root causes of maritime crime; and support coastal states in their efforts to create jobs.

15.  Impress upon Gulf of Guinea states the need to treat piracy as a transnational organised crime that demands a coordinated response including naval operations, investigative police work and prosecution of suspects; and design programmes to strengthen the capacities of all maritime law enforcement agencies.

To the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Interpol:

16.  Advise and assist with tracking financial flows to Gulf of Guinea states as part of investigations into pirate organisations and the smuggling of hydrocarbons.

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Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion

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OVERVIEW

The Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (Forces démocratiques alliées-Armée nationale de libération de l’Ouganda, ADF-NALU) is one of the oldest but least known armed groups in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the only one in the area to be considered an Islamist terrorist organisation. Although it does not represent the same destabilising threat as the 23 March Movement (M23), it has managed to stand its ground against the Congolese army since 2010. Created in the DRC in 1995 and located in the mountainous DRC-Uganda border area, this Congolese-Ugandan armed group has shown remarkable resilience attributable to its geostrategic position, its successful integration into the cross-border economy and corruption in the security forces. Therefore, before considering any further military action against the ADF-NALU, it would be wise to separate fiction from fact and instead pursue a course of weakening its socio-economic base while at the same time offering a demobilisation and reintegration program to its combatants.

Formed of an alliance of several armed groups supported by external actors (Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire and Hassan al-Turabi’s Sudan), the ADF-NALU initially fought the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni. However, despite its Ugandan origins, it never managed to gain a foothold in its own country and instead settled in eastern Congo, particularly in the remote mountainous border areas. There it became integrated into local communities, participated in cross-border trade and forged relationships with various armed groups in eastern Congo as well as with both Congolese and Ugandan civilian and military authorities. Given their location in this “grey zone”, the ADF-NALU’s lost combatants have been able to survive despite not winning a battle in over fifteen years and having been defeated several times, but never neutralised.

Due to the ADF-NALU’s leader, Jamil Mukulu, a Christian convert to Islam, the group has transformed from a purely Congolese-Ugandan problem into one with regional dimensions, as a component of the trend of radical Islamism in East Africa. However, little is known about such purported links between ADF-NALU and radical Islamist organisations in the region and the group’s allegiance to Islamism seems rather superficial.

The fight against armed groups in eastern Congo continues to be viewed through a military lens, but it would be wise to avoid another ineffective military operation. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the UN, the DRC and Uganda should therefore adopt a different approach that seeks to:

Formulate an intelligence-based strategy to neutralise the ADF-NALU’s cross-border economic and logistical networks. The officers of the Joint Verification Mechanism deployed by the ICGLR in 2012 should work with the UN group of experts to produce a detailed study of these networks and use it to define an appropriate strategy for undermining the armed group’s economic and logistical base. Include the leaders of ADF-NALU’s support networks, inside and outside the DRC, on the list of individuals subject to UN sanctions for their support of armed groups. Congolese and Ugandan military personnel colluding with these networks should be dealt with appropriately by the authorities of their country.Rotate on a regular basis Congolese and Ugandan officers deployed in this region.Introduce a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for Congolese and Ugandan combatants who after investigation are found not to be responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. MONUSCO should appeal to donors to fund the program for Congolese ADF-NALU combatants. Authorise villagers in the Erengeti and Oïcha areas to resume work on their farms, which was suspended by the military authorities.

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Restart

The Central African Republic has a long history of crises, but the way the most recent one was managed indicates that a new security constellation may be emerging in the region.

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The Central African Republic (CAR) has always been a fragile state. The country has seen only five elections, but many coups. With armed rebels once more attacking the government in recent months, one might be tempted to think everything is business as usual in the CAR. That would, however, be the wrong analysis.

It is true, of course, that earlier crises unfolded in a similar way. President François Bozizé has been in power for ten years now, just like his predecessor Félix-Ange Patassé was in 2003, when Bozizé toppled him. Armed gangs are in control of large parts of the country today, as much as they were in 2003, and economic marginalisation is getting worse. And just like in 2003, the current rebellion appears to have been planned from outside the country.  In addition, like in the past, France still has several hundred soldiers in the country.

Nonetheless, this is not 2003 all over again. Some experts are already speaking of a new security constellation in the region. Indeed, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is the peace broker in this crisis, and a new regional leadership is emerging.

The members of the ECCAS have played the main role in this crisis. They successfully mediated between the rebels and the government, and they negotiated the ceasefire. Idriss Déby and Sassou Nguesso, the presidents of Chad and the Republic of Congo respectively, have taken the place of Gabon’s late Omar Bongo, who had been central to regional mediation. Déby and Nguesso orchestrated talks in Libreville and achieved results in record time: in a mere four days, an agreement was debated, drafted and signed between Bozizé and the rebels.

Moreover, a new military actor is now on the scene. Precisely when the French president denied the Central African government the assistance it asked for, South Africa renewed its security agreement with the country and sent 400 troops. For the first time, the South African military has thus ventured beyond southern Africa and the Great Lakes region into an area where it arguably has no immediate strategic interests.

Such action is in line with the continent’s aspirations to have Africans resolve African problems. But coordination between the African peacemakers remains problematic. Pretoria neither took part in the Libreville talks, nor does it seem to have coordinated its military deployment with the ECCAS. However, the Libreville agreement points out that “the members of ECCAS will cooperate with the Central African government to make all foreign troops that do not belong to ECCAS gradually withdraw from the country’s territory depending on the security situation”.

The Libreville agreement has the potential to usher in a time of transition for the Central African Republic. The government of Prime Minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra resigned on 12 January, and the new Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, who was drawn from the opposition, was appointed on 17 January. He will have to arrange an early legislative election, restore peace and security and start crucial social, economic and security reforms before the 2016 presidential election.

For the transition to succeed, those unhappy with the Libreville agreement, such as some commanders of the rebellion and some dignitaries of the Bozizé regime, must be brought on board. The ECCAS will have to monitor developments diligently: its peace consolidation mission (MICOPAX) is already deployed in the Central African Republic, and it is foreseeable that its mandate will have to be reviewed and extended.

The most important thing, however, is that all relevant actors, whether from the Central African Republic or other countries, must learn the lessons of past crises instead of repeating past mistakes. The Central African Republic does not need business as usual under a new government. It needs a new consensus on development, nation and state building.

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Neustart

Die Zentralafrikanische Republik kennzeichnet eine lange Geschichte der Instabilität. Wie die jüngste Krise gehandhabt wurde, deutet indessen auf eine neue sicherheitspolitische Konstellation hin.

Die Zentralafrikanische Republik ist seit jeher politisch instabil: mehrere Staatsstreiche hat das Land erlebt, aber nur fünf politische Wahlen. Und wieder einmal greifen bewaffnete Rebellen die Regierung an. Fast scheint es so, als handele es sich hier um das übliche Szenario. Doch dies könnte ein Trugschluss sein.

Es stimmt, dass sich frühere Aufstände ähnlich gestalteten. Präsident François Bozizé ist seit zehn Jahren an der Macht, genauso wie 2003 sein Vorgänger Félix-Ange Patassé, als Bozizé ihn stürzte. Bewaffnete Gruppen kontrollieren immer noch einen Großteil des Landes und die wirtschaftliche Ausgrenzung nimmt zu. Wie bereits 2003 scheint die Rebellion auch diesmal von außen beeinflusst zu sein. Darüber hinaus hat Frankreich nach wie vor mehrere Hundert Soldaten im Land stationiert.

Dennoch: Es handelt sich hier nicht um das gleiche Szenario wie 2003. Experten sprechen bereits von einer sicherheitspolitischen Neuverteilung in der Region. Tatsächlich deutet es auf einen regionalen Führungswechsel hin, dass die Länder der Zentralafrikanischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (CEEAC) diesmal als Friedensstifter auftreten.

Sie spielten eine herausragende Rolle in der Krise. Mit Erfolg vermittelten sie einen Waffenstillstand zwischen den Rebellen und der Regierung. Idriss Déby und Sassou Ngueso, die Präsidenten von Tschad und der Republik Kongo, nehmen nun den Platz von Omar Bongo ein, dem ehemaligen Präsidenten Gabuns und zentralen Vermittler in der Region. Bei Friedensgesprächen in Libreville erzielten sie Ergebnisse in Rekordzeit. In nur vier Tagen hatten sie eine Einigung zwischen Bozizé und den Rebellen erreicht und unterschrieben zu Papier gebracht.

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Darüber hinaus erscheint jetzt ein neuer militärischer Akteur auf der Bildfläche: Südafrika erneuerte sein Sicherheitsabkommen mit der Zentralafrikanischen Republik in dem Moment, als Frankreichs Präsident der Republik die erbetene Hilfe verweigerte. Südafrika entsandte 400 Soldaten. Damit wagt sich das Land zum ersten Mal militärisch aus dem südlichen Afrika und der Große-Seen-Region hinaus und in einen Teil des Kontinents, in dem es keine strategischen Interessen hat. Darin zeigen sich die Bestrebungen Afrikas, seine Probleme selbst zu lösen. Nur die Abstimmung zwischen den afrikanischen Friedensstiftern bleibt problematisch. Pretoria nahm zum Beispiel weder an den Friedensgesprächen in Libreville teil, noch scheint es seine militärische Beteiligung mit den CEEAC-Mitgliedsstaaten abgesprochen zu haben. Im Libreville-Abkommen steht aber, dass „die Mitgliedsstaaten der CEEAC gemeinsam mit der zentralafrikanischen Regierung dafür Sorge tragen, dass alle ausländischen Truppen, die nicht zur CEEAC gehören, schrittweise aus dem Gebiet abgezogen werden, so es die Sicherheitslage zulässt“.

Dem Libreville-Abkommen ist zuzutrauen, dass es einen Umbruch in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik mit sich bringt. Die Regierung unter Premierminister Faustin-Archange Touadéra legte am 12. Januar ihr Amt nieder, und der neue Premier und Mitglied der Opposition, Nicolas Tiangaye, wurde am 17. Januar eingeschworen. Dieser wird sowohl eine vorgezogene Neuwahl organisieren müssen, als auch Frieden und Sicherheit wieder herstellen. Darüber hinaus stehen Wirtschafts- und Sicherheitsreformen an, und all dies noch vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2016.

Für einen erfolgreichen Wechsel müssen aber besonders jene ins Boot geholt werden, die sich durch das Libreville-Abkommen benachteiligt fühlen – so zum Beispiel Rebellenführer und ehemalige Würdenträger des Bozizé Regimes. Zudem muss die CEEAC die Entwicklung der Lage genauestens beobachten. Ihre Mission zur Konsolidierung des Friedens (MICOPAX) ist bereits in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik angekommen und ihr Mandat hat Aussicht auf Verlängerung.

Nun ist es wichtig, dass alle Akteure – zentralafrikanische sowie ausländische – aus den Fehlern der Vergangenheit lernen. Das letzte was die Zentralafrikanische Regierung jetzt braucht, ist das übliche Prozedere der letzen Jahre. Stattdessen ist Einstimmigkeit gefragt – für die Entwicklung von Staat und Nation.

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Central African Republic: Better Late than Never

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Over nine months, the weak Central African Republic (CAR) state has collapsed, triggering a serious humanitarian crisis, with 400,000 displaced and nearly half the population in need of assistance. The transition government and the regional security force have failed to prevent a descent into chaos in urban areas, in particular Bangui, as well as in the countryside. After months of “wait-and-see” and following deadly clashes, the international community now realises it cannot afford another collapsed state in Africa. Unfortunately, the situation on the ground is deteriorating at a much faster pace than the international mobilisation, and Bangui is vulnerable to a total breakdown in law and order. The UN Security Council should immediately provide a Chapter VII mandate to the new African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA), supported by French troops, to launch an operation to secure Bangui that should then be extended to other cities. Subsequently, religious reconciliation should be prioritised and stabilisation measures adopted.

The risk of the CAR becoming ungovernable that Crisis Group highlighted in June 2013 is now real. The Seleka, a loose coalition of armed groups that took power in a March 2013 coup, has broken up into multiple armed factions, whose thuggery has triggered violent reactions among the population. Further, the conflict has taken on a religious undercurrent between the predominantly Muslim Seleka and Christian self-defence groups.

The CAR faces a number of major challenges: in the short term, restoring law and order and providing immediate humanitarian aid; in the medium term, ensuring that the eighteen-month transition agreed to by the Seleka leaders and other political actors is managed in an effective and sustainable manner; and in the long term, rebuilding the state. Successful transition and reconstruction can only be achieved if minimum security conditions are met. Instability has already spilled over the Cameroon border, and the combination of religious tensions and powerless transitional authorities is the perfect recipe for further deadly clashes between local populations and the various Seleka factions, especially in Bangui.

The current stabilisation effort (deployment of an African Union peacekeeping mission, made up of troops from a 2008 mission) is not working. Following the UN’s technical assessment mission in October 2013 and France’s recent decision to increase its troops in Bangui, there is a growing consensus that a more robust, better-resourced emergency response is needed. The UN Security Council is preparing a resolution that needs to be adopted promptly.

Concurrently, the following short-term measures are required:

The Security Council should authorise, under a UN Chapter VII (obligatory on all member states) resolution, MISCA, supported by French forces, to take all necessary means to help stabilise the situation. Its immediate and primary focus should be on restoring law and order, protecting civilians, providing humanitarian relief and documenting human rights abuses. Other countries should also provide logistical (including transportation) and intelligence support in coordination with France and the African Union.The AU-led forces under MISCA and French forces already on the ground should be reinforced immediately, and together with the very few effective national security forces, should restore law and order in Bangui, including by establishing control of all roads into and out of the city; and helping elements of the national police that have already returned to some police stations previously occupied by Seleka fighters.Once Bangui is secured, the AU-led forces under MISCA and the French should deploy to where fighting between Seleka and self-defence groups is occurring and where tension between Christians and Muslims is high. They should also secure the major routes, such as that connecting Bangui with the Cameroon border.The Security Council, after adopting the Chapter VII resolution, should work to ensure the rapid provision of additional resources – including logistics and the requisite capabilities to conduct night patrols – to ensure MISCA has full operational capacity. Simultaneously, the AU and EU should quickly agree on funding for the salaries of MISCA troops.The following mid-term measures are then required:

The UN and donors should support inter-religious dialogue and implement urgent reconstruction projects, particularly in cities where fighting has occurred and where Christians and Muslims are living separately.Other priorities are to launch the first phase – gathering and disarming – of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for Seleka combatants; to establish a team to investigate the plundering of natural resources; to support the mixed commission of inquiry set up by the transitional authorities; and to quickly deploy local reconstruction teams.

The Security Council should continue to follow the CAR situation closely, and give serious consideration to transition MISCA into an enhanced UN-led multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation when necessary and appropriate. Improving security in the capital and in the worst-affected provinces, returning to normalcy in the main cities and resuming road traffic and trade between Bangui and the provinces could pave the way for a successful transition in the medium term. For this to happen, as Crisis Group’s June report recommended, a number of other steps remain relevant, among them the dispatch of a UN electoral assessment mission, security sector reform and public finance reform. But this is not today’s concern: as CAR stares into an abyss of potentially appalling proportions, the focus must remain squarely on the quickest, most decisive means of restoring security.

Nairobi/Brussels, 2 December 2013

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Africa's Crumbling Center

The Central African Republic is often called a forgotten country, but that isn’t quite right. It has had a long and substantial international presence and sizable foreign investment. It’s just that those efforts haven’t made much difference. As the country rapidly descends into greater violence, the difficult truth is that more — and much better — international and regional involvement is its only hope.

France has had an almost continuous military presence since the country gained independence in 1960, including the 400 soldiers deployed at the start of the current crisis. The European Union has a delegation in Bangui and has been the main donor for 10 years. United States Army personnel arrived in 2011 as part of efforts to capture Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, who has been indicted on war crimes charges by the International Criminal Court and is believed to be hiding somewhere in Central Africa.

The foreign presence is not limited to Western countries. South Africa had a bilateral military cooperation program from 2008 to 2012. Last March, 13 of its troops were killed attempting to keep President François Bozizé in power. The regional Economic Community of Central African States has maintained a peacekeeping force since 2008. Its 2,500 troops will soon come under the command of the African Union-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (Misca). Moreover, the United Nations has been working to rebuild the country since 2010.

The Central African Republic was supposed to be a test case for the latest thinking on how to deal with fragile states. Given all this political, military and development assistance, it is difficult to understand why the country is not only weak, but dissolving.

President Bozizé was ousted by a loose alliance of guerrilla fighters from throughout the region known as Seleka, which supported his successor, Michel Djotodia. In September, Mr. Djotodia, in a move that contributed to instability, disbanded Seleka. With no chain of command, the fighters descended into banditry and widespread violence. With no effective national army to challenge them, violent militias are now protecting some elements of the population and terrorizing others.

The spreading conflict has also taken on a religious dimension, with fighting between Muslims and Christians. The transitional authorities are weak and the modest African peacekeeping force is no deterrent against the militias, which includes mostly Muslim fighters.

After intervening successfully in Mali, France is preparing to salvage another of its former colonies, beginning with an additional 800 troops. Last Monday, the United Nations deputy secretary general, Jan Eliasson, asked the Security Council to reinforce the African Union-led mission and ultimately to transform it into a United Nations peacekeeping force. Discussions are underway on a new resolution. The United States has proposed a budget of $40 million.

But United Nations peacekeepers are not going to arrive any time soon and the situation in Bangui is fast deteriorating. With a prompt and robust mandate accompanied by effective funding, African and French troops might be able to pull the country back from the brink. But the key to ending the country’s nightmare will also lie in the ability of Africa, France and the United Nations to forge a well-coordinated strategic partnership to restore order and rebuild the institutions necessary to preserve order.

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Imaginación para salvar República Centroafricana. Cómo actuar con rapidez y eficacia para evitar la somalización del país.

Los conflictos en los países pequeños suelen agravarse debido a la indiferencia internacional. Sin embargo, en el caso de la República Centroafricana (RCA), el problema es ligeramente distinto. Hay una importante presencia internacional en este Estado, pero los actores principales han decidido mantenerse al margen y esperar en vez de intervenir activamente en la crisis.

Mientras tanto, el país está viniéndose abajo a toda velocidad. Los servicios públicos ya no existen; la economía formal se ha derrumbado; los niños soldados han reaparecido; los periodistas viven con miedo; las relaciones entre cristianos y musulmanes se ha vuelto violentas; y el país está posiblemente al borde de una crisis humanitaria, precisamente cuando hasta los miembros de las organizaciones de ayuda están amenazados.

La comunidad internacional debe tener en cuenta una realidad fundamental: si la RCA se hunde, la estabilidad de toda la región, ya frágil, correrá grave peligro.

Para que la RCA no se destruya por completo, sus amigos deben unir fuerzas y usar la imaginación con el fin de encontrar las soluciones más rápidas y adecuadas. El reto inmediato es garantizar una seguridad suficiente como para poder convocar unas elecciones fiables. El desafío a largo plazo es reconstruir el Estado.

La crisis de la república tiene una larga historia. El fracaso de la democracia en los 90, el mal gobierno durante la primera década del siglo XXI y la costumbre de gobernar por la fuerza han desembocado en la violencia y la anarquía actuales. En 2007, International Crisis Group calificó la RCA de Estado fantasma. Hoy, incluso las propias autoridades del país están de acuerdo en que el aparato del Estado corre peligro de desaparecer. El presidente de transición, Michel Djotodia, reconoce que los rebeldes Seleka, responsables del golpe de Estado que derrocó en marzo de 2013 al presidente François Bozizé y le llevó a él al poder, son un motivo de inseguridad.

La intervención internacional en la RCA incluye una importante presencia de tropas extranjeras. Desde 2010 está en activo la Oficina Integrada de la ONU para la Consolidación de la Paz en la República Centroafricana (BINUCA); la Comunidad Económica de los Estados de África Central (CEEAC) mantiene una fuerza de paz desde 2008; Francia cuenta con una presencia militar casi continua en la RCA desde que el Estado obtuvo la independencia, en 1960, y en los primeros momentos de la crisis actual desplegó 400 soldados para asegurar el aeropuerto, y además en el este del país, el Ejército de Uganda y los asesores militares estadounidenses buscan desde 2011 (hasta ahora, sin éxito) al comandante del Ejército de Resistencia del Señor, Joseph Kony, sobre el que pesa una orden de captura de la Corte Penal Internacional.

A pesar de todas estas actuaciones de potencias extranjeras, ha sido imposible tanto impedir el golpe como estabilizar después la situación. La BINUCA no ha conseguido instaurar un programa de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración, igual que no logró convencer al régimen de Bozizé de que reformara el sector de la seguridad y consolidara la paz. La CEEAC no ha sido capaz de restablecer el orden en una de las capitales más pequeñas de África, y los Estados que tienen tropas en el país no han enviado los 600 soldados más que se comprometieron a enviar en abril. Lo paradójico es que Francia, que se encarga de mantener la seguridad en el aeropuerto de Bangui, al mismo tiempo ha acogido al presidente derrocado Bozizé, que ha declarado desde su exilio en París su deseo de recuperar el poder por la fuerza, con la ayuda de fuerzas privadas.

Por si fuera poco, la reciente decisión de intentar desplegar una misión encabezada por la Unión Africana (UA), que parecía una buena idea, en la práctica depende de la financiación de la Unión Europea, el apoyo logístico de Naciones Unidas y la aceptación política por parte de la CEEAC.

El deterioro del país está produciéndose con mucha más rapidez que la movilización de las organizaciones internacionales, enfrascadas en disputas absurdas sobre el dinero y el control de las operaciones. La lenta y torpe reacción internacional podría tener graves consecuencias, no solo en la RCA, sino también en la frontera oriental de Camerún e incluso otros países vecinos.

Los fracasos anteriores y la violencia actual exigen que los socios regionales e internacionales de la RCA hagan gala de la imaginación y el compromiso necesarios para coordinarse mejor. Las intervenciones internacionales deben basarse en la rapidez y la eficacia, así como en una distribución lógica de las funciones, en el que la capacidad vaya de la mano de la responsabilidad.

Las fuerzas francesas en Bangui deben restablecer la seguridad mientras el país espera la llegada de la misión encabezada por la UA y se planifica el despliegue de unas fuerzas africanas dirigidas por la CEEAC en las demás ciudades importantes, sobre todo en el oeste, donde se han concentrado en los últimos tiempos la violencia y las violaciones más graves de los derechos humanos.

El reparto de tareas entre Francia y la CEEAC debería proporcionar la seguridad necesaria para permitir que las autoridades de transición y los donantes pongan en marcha un programa de desmovilización e inicien la reforma del sistema de seguridad, con el fin de que sean las propias fuerzas de la RAC las que vuelvan a encargarse de ella y, de esa forma, impedir que se unan al incipiente movimiento contrarrevolucionario en el oeste del país.

La oportunidad de evitar lo que el presidente francés François Hollande ha llamado la posible “somalización” de la República Centroafricana pasará enseguida y se perderá si no se pone en práctica una respuesta acelerada en materia de seguridad. La CEEAC y Francia, que tienen ya tropas sobre el terreno, deben actuar con

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Central African Republic is descending into anarchy

Since the March 24 coup by the Seleka, a loose coalition of Muslim rebels, the Central African Republic has been in free fall. There are about 400,000 internally displaced people, 64,000 refugees, and burned villages, largely in the western part of the country. Banditry, the rise of self-defense militias and clashes between Christian and Muslim communities are now part of daily life for this mineral-rich country in the heart of Africa. The expanding insecurity makes the delivery of humanitarian assistance difficult, and the United Nations has even warned of the risk of genocide.

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Michel Djotodia, the leader of the Seleka, hails from the northeast and was the leader of the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR), one of the armed groups that have challenged the central government since 2007. He is now president of the transition.

The Seleka’s main objective in its move was ousting then-President Francois Bozize. The CAR’s former ruler participated in several attempted coups and finally took power in 2003, also by force. Bozize was re-elected twice, in 2005 and 2011; his second re-election was marred by vote-rigging allegations.

Since this year's coup occurred, what was supposed to be a three-year process toward a new political order has turned into anarchy. Today Seleka rebels are looting the capital city, Bangui. Djotodia officially dissolved them in September, but even before this formal act, the Seleka was a tenuous coalition. Since then the various armed groups have become autonomous; the chain of command, if it really existed, has disappeared. Seleka fighters roam independently, and some commanders have become warlords. The armed groups are now roving bandits and have triggered local self-defense forces and anti-Muslim reactions because of their exactions against the population, notably in the western part of the country, Bozize’s former fiefdom. In exile, shuttling back and forth between Africa and Europe, Bozize is wanted by the CAR’s attorney general and has stated that he intends to come back by force.

This rapid decline in security has been accompanied by the complete collapse of state institutions and the rise of religious tensions. After those institutions had been eroding for decades, the coup sealed their fate: State security services vanished into thin air, civil servants fled and basic services stopped. For the CAR, it was the coup de trop — the final push.

In the five months after the March coup, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and France, a former colonial power and the only Western country with troops stationed in the CAR, adopted a wait-and-see approach. France was focused on Mali; ECCAS figured the coup was merely business as usual. They urged the new rulers to respect the principles of a national-unity government and previously negotiated political accords, but they did not try to address the security situation, leaving it to CAR transitional authorities — the interim governing authority led by Djotodia.

The outcome of this approach is now clear: The Seleka have become brigands, the country has no central administration, clashes between youths and Seleka fighters occur daily in Bangui, relations between Christians and Muslims have turned violent and the transitional authorities are completely powerless. Recent violence in the western CAR between Seleka fighters and self-defense militias and between Christians and Muslims is, however, a wake-up call. As a result, the long-standing peaceful religious coexistence in a country where Muslims represent between 10 and 20 percent of the population is in jeopardy. The United Nations, ECCAS, the African Union (AU), France and the United States now realize that they cannot afford a new failed state on the continent. But they have yet to articulate an effective response to the highest priority, the swift restoration of law and order.

A short-lived optimism

At a time when the AU is brainstorming about the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), a continental standby force to be used for peacekeeping missions, there are serious lessons to learn from the CAR crash. As documented in the International Crisis Group reports Anatomy of a Phantom State and Dangerous Little Stones: Diamonds in the Central African Republic, the crisis in the CAR is rooted in a long history of state decay and bad governance, particularly in the diamond sector.

Nonetheless, the current collapse could have been avoided. After the Seleka armed groups arrived at the doorstep of the capital last December, the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic, or MICOPAX — an African peacekeeping force deployed by ECCAS and backed by a French military mission since 2008 — was reinforced and tasked with protecting Bangui. In an unexpected move that was interpreted as a direct show of support for the very weak Bozize regime, South Africa swiftly deployed its forces to Bangui. ECCAS also sponsored the Libreville agreement, signed on Jan. 11 by Bozize, the democratic opposition parties and rebel leaders, which led to a government of national unity. At the beginning of this year, the rebels were militarily contained by MICOPAX and politically accommodated. A smooth constitutional end of Bozize’s regime in 2016 and a success story for the implementation of the AU’s peace and security architecture appeared to be in place.

But this optimism was short-lived. First, among the rebels and the democratic opposition, skepticism grew over whether the political agreement would be implemented. Bozize seemed ever less likely to share power. He dragged his feet to set up an inclusive government, made many decisions unilaterally and rearmed. His anti-Muslim speeches further stirred tension.

Second, other signatories to the Libreville agreement, particularly the ECCAS countries, became dissatisfied with Bozize. They had financially supported his bankrupt regime for years and were instrumental in negotiating the political agreement and stopping the rebels. Bozize’s attempt to sabotage the negotiated transition by inviting South Africa, an outsider, into the regional power play precipitated the crisis. Despite its interposition mandate, the African peacekeeping force did not prevent the rebels from marching on Bangui. Unaware of the political gamesmanship, the South African forces briefly clashed with the rebels and lost 13 soldiers. The full disaster began to unfold.

Lessons from the crisis

What does the CAR crisis mean for African peace and security?

First, the AU’s peace and security architecture works only when there is regional consensus on the political solution required to solve a crisis. ECCAS had enough political leverage to impose a negotiated solution and could have successfully managed a certain level of military threat. However, its lack of political consensus led to military failure, as demonstrated by the uncoordinated South African army deployment.

Second, African peacekeeping capacities are still too thin and need external support. Given that ECCAS was not able or willing to reach the target of 2,000 troops, the AU stepped in to transform the ECCAS-led mission into an AU-led peacekeeping mission to the Central African Republic — MISCA. But the AU is bumping into the same problems: funding, logistics and human resources. The transformation of a Central African regional mission into one led by the AU allows for larger troop contributions from across the continent, but the AU is unable to foot the bill and provide much-needed logistics. This is why the United Nations and the European Union are now deliberating on possible international support to MISCA.

Third, prevention of a crisis is much better than a cure — and much cheaper. The CAR crisis is like a boomerang that has returned to strike ECCAS countries. Insecurity is rife on the border with Cameroon, and it may spread to other neighboring countries. If ECCAS countries had only anticipated the consequences of giving free passage to rebels to march on Bangui, they would have acted to prevent the coup and the subsequent mayhem.

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Centrafrique: Sortir des sentiers battus pour sauver la Centrafrique

L’indifférence internationale est un facteur aggravant pour les conflits dans les petits pays. Cependant, en ce qui concerne la République centrafricaine (RCA), le contexte est paradoxalement différent. La présence de la communauté internationale est conséquente dans ce pays, mais les principaux acteurs adoptent une attitude attentiste au lieu de s’engager activement dans la résolution de cette crise.

Pendant ce temps, le pays est en chute libre. Les services publics n’existent plus ; l’économie formelle non plus ; les enfants soldats ont refait leur apparition ; les journalistes ont peur de faire leur travail ; la coexistence religieuse entre chrétiens et musulmans laisse place à la violence ; une crise humanitaire s’annonce et c’est la loi du plus fort qui prévaut, y compris à l’égard des travailleurs humanitaires. Le paradoxe de cette crise est que la Centrafrique n’est pas, comme on le dit souvent, un pays abandonné par la communauté internationale. L’effondrement de la RCA se déroule sous les yeux de nombreux acteurs internationaux.

Cette semaine, en marge de l’ouverture de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies à New York, la communauté internationale devra considérer cette crise dans son ensemble : si la RCA s’effondre, c’est la stabilité déjà fragile de la région tout entière qui en pâtira.

Pour éviter le scénario du pire, les partenaires étrangers de la RCA doivent dès maintenant s’unir et user de leur imagination afin de trouver des solutions appropriées. A court terme, le défi est de restaurer un minimum de sécurité afin de permettre des élections crédibles. A long terme, il est de reconstruire le pays.

Cette crise s’inscrit dans la longue durée. Une démocratisation manquée dans les années 1990, la mauvaise gouvernance structurelle pendant les dix premières années du 21ème siècle et l’habitude de gouverner par la force ont conduit aux violences et à l’anarchie actuelles. En 2007, l’International Crisis Group avait parlé d’Etat fantôme au sujet de la RCA mais, aujourd’hui, de l’aveu même de ses nouveaux dirigeants, c’est l’existence de la RCA en tant qu’Etat qui est en jeu. Comme le reconnaît maintenant le président de la transition Michel Djotodia, les rebelles qui ont pris le pouvoir en mars 2013 sont eux même une source d’insécurité.

L’engagement international en RCA se traduit par une présence importante de troupes étrangères. En outre :

Les Nations unies ont installé un Bureau intégré pour la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine (Binuca) actif depuis 2010.La Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC) entretient une force de maintien de la paix depuis 2008.La France, qui a eu des militaires en RCA presque sans discontinuer depuis l’indépendance, a déployé depuis le début de cette crise 400 hommes qui sécurisent l’aéroport.Enfin, à l’Est du pays, l’armée ougandaise et des conseillers militaires américains traquent depuis 2011 (sans réel succès) le chef de l’Armée de résistance du Seigneur, Joseph Kony, qui est recherché par la Cour pénale internationale.

De manière surprenante, cette présence internationale substantielle (surtout militaire) n’a pu ni empêcher la prise de Bangui en mars ni empêcher les violences qui se déroulent depuis six mois. Le Binuca n’a été ni capable de mettre en œuvre un programme de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion (DDR) ni de convaincre l’ancien régime de réformer le secteur de la sécurité et encore moins de consolider la paix. La CEEAC est incapable de rétablir l’ordre dans une des plus petites capitales d’Afrique et ne parvient toujours pas à trouver 600 soldats supplémentaires pour atteindre l’objectif qu’elle s’est fixée à Ndjamena au mois d’avril. Paradoxalement, tout en sécurisant l’aéroport de Bangui, la France accueille le président déchu Bozizé qui déclare préparer la contre-rébellion depuis les bords de Seine grâce à « l’aide » d’acteurs privés qui paraissent disposer d’une liberté de manœuvre quasi-totale.

Pire, la formule de sauvetage actuellement proposée va contre le bon sens. Alors qu’il était évident il y a six mois que la sécurité serait l’obstacle n°1 de la transition et que les exactions dans l’Ouest du pays et à Bangui préfigurent de plus grandes violences entre les combattants de la Seleka et les populations, la solution consensuelle est le déploiement d’une mission de l’Union africaine (UA). En théorie, cela semble une bonne idée mais, en pratique, une telle mission dépend de l’Union européenne pour son financement, des Nations unies pour sa logistique et de la CEEAC pour son acceptation politique.

Or la dynamique locale de déliquescence va bien plus vite que la « mobilisation » des organisations internationales qui est entravée par des querelles picrocholines autour du leadership et du financement de cette mission. Cette lente et maladroite réponse internationale pourrait avoir des conséquences importantes non seulement pour la RCA mais également pour la frontière orientale du Cameroun et probablement pour ses pays voisins. Les échecs passés et les violences présentes exigent des partenaires régionaux et internationaux qu’ils fassent preuve d’imagination et assurent une meilleure coordination. Une intervention internationale doit reposer sur des partenariats rapides et efficaces et une division claire des rôles où capacité rime avec responsabilité.

En attendant l’arrivée de la mission de l’UA et pour répondre à l’urgence, l’armée française qui est déjà sur place devrait restaurer la sécurité dans Bangui tandis que la force africaine devrait se charger des autres grandes villes du pays, notamment à l’Ouest.

Cette répartition des tâches entre la France et la CEEAC offrirait aux autorités de transition et aux bailleurs la pause sécuritaire qui leur est indispensable pour lancer un DDR et engager la reconstruction de l’Etat par le secteur de la sécurité. Après le lancement d’un DDR, les Nations unies, l’UE et les autorités de transition devraient immédiatement enclencher une réforme du secteur de sécurité afin de remettre au travail les anciennes forces de sécurité et éviter qu’elles ne rejoignent une contre-rébellion naissante dans l’Ouest de la Centrafrique. Le dernier rapport de Crisis Group (République centrafricaine : les urgences de la transition) détaille le possible montage politique et financier de ces opérations.

La fenêtre d’opportunité pour éviter la somalisation de la Centrafrique évoquée par le président de la République française va se refermer rapidement. La CEEAC et la France, qui ont déjà des troupes sur place, ne devraient pas la manquer.

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Central African Republic: Thinking Out of the Box to Save the CAR

Conflicts in small countries are often made worse by international indifference. In the case of the Central African Republic (CAR), however, the problem is a little different. There is a substantial international presence in the country, but the main actors are adopting a wait-and-see attitude rather than pro-actively engaging with the crisis.

Meanwhile, the country is rapidly falling apart. Public services no longer exist; the formal economy has collapsed; child soldiers have reappeared; journalists live in fear; relations between Christians and Muslims have turned violent; and the country may be on the brink of a humanitarian crisis at a time when even aid workers are under threat.

As a meeting on the CAR takes place in New York this week on the sidelines of the annual opening of the United Nations General Assembly, the international community must consider an over-arching reality: if the CAR goes under, the already fragile stability of the whole region will be gravely at risk.

If the CAR is not to collapse entirely, its friends need to pull together and use a little imagination to find the right solutions, and soon. The short-term challenge is to establish enough basic security to enable credible elections. The long-term challenge is to rebuild the state.

The crisis in the republic has a long history. Failed democracy in the 1990s, bad governance during the first ten years of the 21st century and a habit of governing by force led to the present violence and lawlessness. In 2007, the International Crisis Group referred to CAR as a phantom state. Today, even the country's rulers agree that their state apparatus is in danger of disappearing. Transitional president Michel Djotodia recognises that the Seleka rebels who staged the March 2013 coup ousting President Francois Bozizé, which resulted in Djotodia coming to power, are themselves a source of insecurity.

International involvement in the CAR includes a significant foreign troop presence. In addition:

The UN Integrated Office for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) has been active since 2010.The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has maintained a peacekeeping force since 2008.France has had an almost continuous military presence in CAR since the country gained independence in 1960, and it deployed 400 soldiers at the start of the current crisis to secure the airport.Finally, in eastern CAR the Ugandan army and American military advisors have tracked (so far unsuccessfully) the chief of the Lord's Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, who is under indictment by the International Criminal Court, since 2011.

All this foreign involvement has failed to prevent the recent coup or stabilize its aftermath. BINUCA has not been able to implement a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration program, and it failed to convince Bozizé’s regime to reform the security sector or consolidate the peace. ECCAS has been unable to restore order in one of the smallest capitals of Africa, and troop-contributing countries have proved unable to deliver the 600 extra soldiers they committed to provide in April. Paradoxically, France, while securing Bangui’s airport, is also hosting ousted president Bozizé, who declared from exile in Paris his wish to retake power by force with the “support” of private actors.

To make matters worse, a recent decision to try to deploy a mission led by the African Union (AU) seemed a good idea, but in reality its establishment remains contingent on funding from the European Union, logistical support from the United Nations and political acceptance by ECCAS.

The deterioration in the country is happening much faster than the “mobilisation” of international organisations, beset as they are by petty disputes over leadership and financing. This slow and clumsy international response could have major consequences not only in the CAR but for Cameroon’s eastern border and potentially for other neighboring countries.

Past failures and the current violence require the country's regional and international partners to show the imagination and commitment to achieve better coordination. International interventions must be based on quick and effective partnerships and a sound division of labor, where capacity goes with responsibility.

The French force in Bangui should restore security even as the country waits for the arrival of an AU led-mission and as plans are made to deploy African forces led by ECCAS to other major cities, especially in the west where violence and serious human rights abuses recently occurred.

Such a division of labor between France and ECCAS should provide the security necessary to enable the transitional authorities and donors to launch a demobilisation program and kick-start security reforms in order to put CAR's own security forces back to work and prevent them from joining an emerging counter-rebellion in the west. (The International Crisis Group's last report (Central African Republic: priorities of the transition) details the political and financial support needed to pursue demobilisation and security sector reform in the CAR.)

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Understanding Conflict in Eastern Congo (I): The Ruzizi Plain

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The February 2013 framework agreement signed by the UN, African organisations and eleven regional countries, as well as the deployment of an intervention brigade, represent yet another of many attempts to end the crisis in the Kivus. Conflicts in this region, however, stem mainly from competition between communities for land and economic opportunities and require tailored, grassroots solutions that should go beyond a military response and promote local conflict resolution. Those seeking to secure peace in the Kivus should gain sound knowledge of local dynamics and design strategies to tackle the root causes of violence and improve relations between communities.

The imperative of pursuing local responses to the crisis is illustrated by the longstanding conflict in the Ruzizi plain, located in Uvira territory at the border of South Kivu and Burundi. In a context of impunity and distrust, the assassination on 25 April 2012 of the Ruzizi plain traditional leader, who belongs to the Barundi community, sparked renewed violence between it and a rival community, the Bafuliro. Despite several reconciliation attempts by the central government and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Congo (MONUSCO), tensions persist in 2013.

The Bafuliro and Barundi have fought over land and traditional leadership in the Ruzizi plain since colonial times. Tensions remain high because of socio-economic underdevelopment, the mismanagement of land affairs and poor local governance due to weaknesses in provincial and central administration. Instead of acting as secondary figures, traditional chiefs play a leading role in Congo’s politics and administration. Perceived as influential during elections, they are part of political patronage networks and have support in national and provincial institutions.

Despite a decade of efforts to rebuild the Congolese state, the government remains ineffective in rural areas, leaving customary chiefs, whose role is recognised by the constitution but not fully defined, virtually in charge. They use their key position between the state and communities to benefit from any state and international investments and to protect their own interests. This fuels conflict, with intercommunal rivalries playing out in state institutions and among local and national politicians.

In 2012, aware of the hostility between the Bafuliro and Barundi, MONUSCO and local, provincial and national authorities attempted to mediate between the two communities. But although the leaders of both signed in September 2012 a code of conduct, fighting resumed shortly afterwards. The natural death of the Bafuliro traditional chief in December 2012 has led to a lull in violence, but the conflict, although, dormant, could easily flare up again.

The failure of mediation shows that local conflicts need local resolution strategies. These include controlling customary powers, setting up impartial and effective institutions to regulate and administer land, reducing armed violence and initiating intercommunal dialogue. Some of these measures will, admittedly, be more difficult to implement than others. But without an understanding of local issues, the peace process initiated by the UN, African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and regional countries risks addressing symptoms rather than causes of conflict in the Kivus. Stabilisation initiatives in eastern Congo have so far been limited to military action against armed groups and top-down state building. This report, the first in a series that focuses on the local politics of conflicts in eastern Congo, recommends a complementary bottom-up approach aimed at improving intercommunal relations and restoring peace at the local level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To enhance control of customary powers

To the DRC government and local authorities:

1.  Disseminate the laws on customary powers to the population and customary authorities, and train customary chiefs so they can assume their functions in accordance with the law.

To improve land management

To the DRC government and local authorities:

2.  Develop a land management code for traditional leaders in Uvira territory until more complete land reform that redefines the role of traditional authorities in land management is in place.

3.  Provide land management institutions (the local courts and land administration) with human and financial resources; ensure all ethnic groups in Uvira territory are adequately represented in these institutions; and set up a district court in Uvira to bring land justice closer to claimants and speed up procedures.

To the UN and donors:

4.  Establish, under the auspices of UN-Habitat, a land committee in Uvira territory that will identify the sources of land disputes and define a local land dispute resolution strategy.

5.  Increase UN presence and coordination in Uvira by deploying staff of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN-Habitat who will bring expertise in land dispute resolution and agricultural development to MONUSCO’s office in Uvira.

To restore dialogue between communities

To the UN and donors:

6.  Commission a study on the local non-governmental organisations involved in conflict resolution in order to identify impartial local partners and strengthen their capacity to mediate disputes.

7.  Commission a study to identify all parties to the conflict in order to organise truly inclusive activities to promote peace and intercommunal dialogue.

8.  Disseminate, through the consultative local forum, the agreement signed by the Barundi and Bafuliro leaders, organise intercommunal meetings and promote joint development projects.

To reduce armed violence

To the DRC government and local authorities:

9.  Launch investigations to identify the leaders of the main armed groups, arrest and try them, as well as those responsible for intercommunal clashes, outside South Kivu province.

To the DRC government, the UN and donors:

10.  Produce a detailed intelligence report about the economic and logistical networks of armed groups that would inform a strategy to cut off their resources. The report should be a joint work of the UN group of experts and the officers of the joint border verification mechanism deployed by the ICGLR.

11.  Implement a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration program (DDR) that prioritises the communities of Uvira territory and the socio-economic reintegration of a majority of former Congolese combatants.

12.  Deploy Congolese security forces that are not from South Kivu, increase the number of UN peacekeepers, and ensure both forces prioritise the fight against smuggling.

13.  Formalise the mineral trade and use a share of the mining revenues to fund development programs targeting former combatants and the local population.

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The DRC is a Hornet’s Nest South Africa Should not Kick

South Africa’s efforts to foster peace and security have placed it centre stage in some of the continent’s most intractable conflicts.

This is an inevitable result of the quest to promote “African solutions for African problems”.

It comes at a time when the continent lags behind on its commitments to establish a functioning standby military force.

The decision at the 50th anniversary summit of the African Union in May to establish an interim emergency force again saw South Africa put up its hand to contribute.

Good intentions, perhaps, but what can the nation actually deliver?

Will its political and diplomatic intentions be appropriately serviced by its weakened military infrastructure, and how is this to be explained to the South African public?

Pretoria’s handling of the Central African Republic (CAR) debacle left much to be desired and was characterised by excessive defensiveness.

Most South Africans had little idea where the CAR was on the map, let alone knew of their government’s earlier commitments to building the army of that nation’s ousted leader, François Bozizé.

A detailed analysis of what actually transpired politically, militarily and diplomatically has yet to be undertaken.

It must be done, if South Africa, and especially its politicians, are to learn from the experience.

The postmortem over events in the CAR capital, Bangui, has raised questions over South Africa’s military capacity, and in particular, the exposed military and political intelligence deficit that resulted in unnecessary exposure and loss of life.

The expansion of its commitments comes as the defence budget is cut yet again and Pretoria this week prepares to deploy 1 345 peacekeepers for an unprecedented UN-led offensive against armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Despite a few similarities, like the provision of military training by South Africa, the backdrop and context of Pretoria’s engagement in the CAR and the DRC are very different.

Unlike in the CAR, where the South African public was largely ignorant and disengaged, in the DRC it is imperative the public know the risks their troops are being exposed to and why.

Public discourse on the DRC situation and South African interests there is narrow and largely insipid.

Yet another rebellion in the east of the nation, allegedly sponsored by neighbouring nations, has exposed the DRC’s lack of democracy and the ongoing failures to promote a political compact that addresses the security concerns of Kinshasa and neighbouring nations, as well as the needs of local populations.

Why is there perennial crisis in the DRC and what will further military intervention achieve?

What use does such costly intervention have if this is not complemented by commitments to and tangible action around political and security-sector reform as well as fundamental improvements in governance?

The former without the latter translates into little more than a containment strategy.

As the UN prepares to deploy its intervention brigade in the Kivus region, South Africans must pay close attention to the parallel peace talks in Kampala, Uganda, convened under the auspices of the

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and Uganda President Yoweri Museveni.

In addition, close attention must be given to Kinshasa’s commitments to reform. A combination of limited capacity and inadequate political will has consistently stymied reforms, fundamentally undermining longer-term prospects for political and security stability.

In this context, South Africans must assess the extent to which these disparate interests converge or diverge as parties seek to maximise their comparative advantage.

What prospects are there for fostering common ground in a context of competing agendas, mutual distrust and an absence of accountability?

How can South Africa promote political settlement and attempt to help with its extended security commitments?

A careful and ongoing assessment of these developments will temper and inform the evolution of the intervention strategy by the UN’s stabilisation efforts in the DRC (through Monusco, the UN organisation tasked with monitoring the peace process in the DRC), but concerns remain regarding the lack of an integrated approach.

It is not even clear whether the intervention brigade, consisting of troops from Malawi and Tanzania as well as South Africa, will have an effective integrated command.

It is also essential to assess the risks and to know who the enemy is – something that was not done effectively in the CAR.

The brigade’s deployment is in direct response to the takeover of and subsequent voluntary withdrawal from Goma in November by the M23 rebel militia.

Since M23 still presents a substantial threat to Goma and the Kampala negotiations between the Congolese government and M23 are stalled, the brigade’s primary target is therefore likely to be this armed group.

This situation is complicated by tensions with Rwanda, which the UN group of experts report for last year claimed were unofficial M23 sponsors.

Addressing this security challenge and accommodating Rwanda’s legitimate security interests without worsening political tensions in the region – as well as tensions between South

Africa and fellow international brigade nations and Rwanda – will be a challenge.

The UN resolution tasks the international brigade to fight against all armed groups in the Kivus region: the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, opposed to the Rwandan regime; the National Forces of Liberation, opposed to the Burundian regime; and the Allied Democratic Forces, opposed to the Ugandan regime.

There are also several dozen local armed groups.

These are not forces that will fight conventionally, and they can move in and out of the densely forested terrain.

It is unlikely the UN brigade will have the capacity or will to flush these forces out.

A stalemate may ensue that does not consolidate security in the Kivus region, though it might temporarily displace sources of insecurity.

The international brigade’s mission is confronted by a range of other challenges: its mandate raises the broader risk profile of Monusco’s operations, both military and civilian, and will require an enhanced tactical coordination of peacekeeping units on the ground.

As demonstrated in the eastern DRC over the last three years, security operations significantly raise the likelihood of civilian casualties and a deterioration of the humanitarian situation.

The security situation and proliferation of armed groups are a symptom and not a cause of instability in the DRC.

Democratic deficit, bad governance and institutional weakness, especially within the security sector, remain the primary causes.

Addressing these must be part of an integrated response.

Without this, the international brigade may prove both an incomplete and dangerous solution to the DRC problem.

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