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Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity?
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although it should provide development opportunities, renewed oil interest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) represents a real threat to stability in a still vulnerable post-conflict country. Exploration has begun, but oil prospecting is nurturing old resentments among local communities and contributing to border tensions with neighbouring countries. If oil reserves are confirmed in the east, this would exacerbate deep-rooted conflict dynamics in the Kivus. An upsurge in fighting since the start of 2012, including the emergence of a new rebellion in North Kivu and the resumption of armed groups’ territorial expansion, has further complicated stability in the east, which is the new focus for oil exploration. New oil reserves could also create new centres of power and question Katanga’s (DRC’s traditional economic hub) political influence. Preventive action is needed to turn a real threat to stability into a genuine development opportunity.
Potential oil reserves straddle the country’s borders with Uganda, Angola and possibly other countries and could rekindle old sensitivities once exploration commences. In the context of a general oil rush in Central and East Africa, the lack of clearly defined borders, especially in the Great Lakes region, poses significant risk for maintaining regional stability.
Clashes between the Congolese and Ugandan armies in 2007 led to the Ngurdoto Accords establishing a system for regulating border oil problems, but Kinshasa’s reluctance to implement this agreement and the collapse of the Ugandan-Congolese dialogue threaten future relations between the two countries. In the west, failure to find an amicable solution to an Angolan-Congolese dispute about offshore concessions has worsened relations between the two countries and led to the violent expulsion from Angola of Congolese nationals. Instead of investing in the resolution of border conflicts with its neighbours before beginning oil exploration, the Congolese government is ignoring the problem, failing to dialogue with Uganda and officially claiming an extension of its maritime borders with Angola.
The abduction in 2011 of an oil employee in the Virunga Park, in the Kivus, is a reminder that exploration is taking place in disputed areas where ethnic groups are competing for territorial control and the army and militias are engaged in years of illegally exploiting natural resources. Given that the Kivus are high-risk areas, oil discovery could aggravate the conflict. Moreover, confirmation of oil reserves in the Central Basin and the east could feed secessionist tendencies in a context of failed decentralisation and financial discontent between the central government and the provinces.
Poor governance has been the hallmark of the oil sector since exploration resumed in the east and west of the country. Even with only one producing oil company, the black gold is the main source of government revenue and yet, with exploration in full swing, oil sector reform is very slow. Instead of creating clear procedures, a transparent legal framework and robust institutions, previous governments have behaved like speculators, in a way that is reminiscent of practices in the mining sector. Reflecting the very degraded business climate, they have allocated and reallocated concessions and often acted without considering the needs of the local people and international commitments, especially regarding environmental protection.
The official division of exploration blocks includes natural parks, some of which are World Heritage Sites. It also directly threatens the resources of local populations in some areas. Initiatives to promote financial and contractual transparency are contradicted by the lack of transparency in allocating concessions. The state’s failure to adequately regulate the diverging and potentially conflicting interests of companies and poor communities is clearly causing local resentment, which could easily flare up into local violence that could be manipulated.
In a context of massive poverty, weak state, poor governance and regional insecurity, an oil rush will have a strong destabilising effect unless the government adopts several significant steps regionally and nationally to avert such a devastating scenario. Regionally, it should draw on the close support of the African Union (AU) and the World Bank Group to design a management model for cross-border reserves and help facilitate a border demarcation program. Nationally, the government should implement oil sector reform, declare a moratorium on the exploration of insecure areas, especially in the east where the situation is again deteriorating, until these territories are made secure, and involve the provinces in the main management decisions concerning this resource.
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Eastern Congo: Why Stabilisation Failed
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OVERVIEWSince Bosco Ntaganda’s mutiny in April 2012 and the subsequent creation of the 23 March rebel movement (M23), violence has returned to the Kivus. However today’s crisis bears the same hallmarks as yesterday’s, a consequence of the failure to implement the 2008 framework for resolution of the conflict. Rather than effectively implementing the 23 March 2009 peace agreement signed by the government and the CNDP (National Council for the Defence of the People), the Congolese authorities have instead only feigned the integration of the CNDP into political institutions, and likewise the group appears to have only pretended to integrate into the Congolese army. Furthermore in the absence of the agreed army reform, military pressure on armed groups had only a temporary effect and, moreover, post-conflict reconstruction has not been accompanied by essential governance reforms and political dialogue. To move away from crisis management and truly resolve this two-decade-old conflict, donors should put pressure on both Kigali and Kinshasa.
The M23 is behaving in a similar fashion to previous rebel movements by creating its own administration and its own financing system in parts of North Kivu. Meanwhile, Mai-Mai groups are expanding in rural areas where they commit atrocities that exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions. In July this year, in accordance with the peace and security architecture, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) organised a regional dialogue to avoid conflict between Rwanda and the DRC. Unfortunately, the outcome of this was an unrealistic and ineffective solution: the deployment of a 4,000-strong neutral force at the border between Rwanda and the DRC. If international donors and African mediators persist in managing the crisis rather than solving it, it will be impossible to avoid such repetitive cycles of rebellions in the Kivus and the risk of large-scale violence will remain. Instead, to finally resolve this conflict, it is essential that Rwanda ends its involvement in Congolese affairs and that the reconstruction plan and the political agreements signed in the Kivus are properly implemented. For these things to happen Western donors should maintain aid suspension against Rwanda until the release of the next report of the UN group of experts, in addition to issuing a clear warning to the Congolese authorities that they will not provide funding for stabilisation and institutional support until the government improves political dialogue and governance in both the administration and in the army in the east, as recommended by Crisis Group on several previous occasions.
In the short term, this crisis can be dealt with through the following initiatives:
the negotiation and monitoring of a ceasefire between the Congolese authorities and the M23 by the UN;the reactivation of an effective and permanent joint verification mechanism for the DRC and Rwandan border, as envisaged by the ICGLR, which should be provided with the necessary technical and human resources;the addition of the individuals and entities that supported the M23 and other armed groups to the UN sanctions list and the consideration of an embargo on weapons sales to Rwanda;the joint evaluation of the 23 March 2009 agreement in the framework of the international follow-up committee it established and this assessment should be the basis for resumption of dialogue between the government and the CNDP;the launch of local peace initiatives in Walikale, Masisi, Shabunda and Kalehe areas where ethnic tension is high by MONUSCO and the government;the arrest and handover of Bosco Ntaganda to the International Criminal Court (ICC); andthe launch of an investigation by the ICC into the actions of M23 and new armed groups, and the request by the ICC that MONUSCO transfer to it its files concerning M23 leaders.After analysing the failure of the stabilisation of the Kivus in the report Congo: No Stability in Kivu Despite a Rapprochement with Rwanda, this new Crisis Group briefing explains the surge of violence and underlines that the Kivus do not need a new strategic approach; rather, the peace agreements and stabilisation plans should no longer remain empty promises. To achieve this, coordinated and unequivocal pressure is required from the donors that help fund the Rwandan and Congolese regimes.
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Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha?
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the institutions are functioning and the government has been priding itself on its development and security achievements, Burundi is regressing. Due to the 2010 electoral impasse, the Arusha agreement has been replaced by a de facto one-party system characterised by the end of dialogue between the opposition and the ruling party, the government’s authoritarian drift and the resumption of political violence. Respect for the political minorities and rule of law has been largely ignored since 2010. To ensure lasting stability, the political actors should resume dialogue, guarantee pluralism for the 2015 elections and support a consensual transitional justice process. Given that they sponsor peacebuilding efforts, provide a significant amount of aid to Burundi and in the absence of other donors, the current international partners should focus on these issues while discussing with the government.
The dust has not yet settled since the 2010 elections. After boycotting the electoral process, the opposition parties formed a coalition (the Democratic Alliance for Change, ADC-Ikibiri) and several opposition leaders went into exile. A wave of mutual violence by the opposition and the ruling party (the National Council for the Defence of Democracy and the Forces for the Defence of Democracy, CNDD-FDD) ensued. Challenged by armed groups and criticised by civil society, the government has resorted to repression and intimidation.
The control of the institutions by the ruling party and the absence of a genuine opposition made the power-sharing system defined by the Arusha agreement irrelevant. The ruling party is managing state business and the transitional justice process as it wishes. In addition, it is instrumentalising the security services and is preparing a constitutional change behind closed doors. Today, the only checks and balances are the media and civil society.
However, there is a window of opportunity. On the one hand, socio-economic problems, rising social discontent and extrajudicial killings put severe strains on the government. On the other hand, parallel dialogues have recently started between the European Union and the Burundian government and between Burundian political actors. From 28 May to 2 June 2012, the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Initiatives and Change hosted a meeting in Switzerland with representatives of most of the opposition parties, civil society leaders and two members of the ruling party.
Continuing these parallel dialogues and consolidating peace in Burundi will require mutual concessions by the ruling party and the opposition. It will also require that the donors maintain dialogue with the authorities on the political and security problems and resort to financial incentives, particularly for the preparation of the elections and the security sector reform. International efforts should focus on protecting journalists and civil society activists, empowering the independent human rights commission and promoting a security sector reform centred on human rights.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government and the Opposition of Burundi:
1. Initiate quickly inclusive talks as a follow-up to the Switzerland meeting and focusing on the return of the opposition leaders, the respect of political freedom, the legal framework for the 2015 elections and the issue of political detainees.
To the Opposition:
2. Condemn publicly political violence and stop questioning the legitimacy of the 2010 elections.
To the Government:
3. Ensure political pluralism ahead of the 2015 elections by:
a) reviewing laws and bills about political parties, media and demonstrations and public gatherings that may limit political competition and freedom of speech;
b) making sure that the leadership of the new electoral commission is designated following a consensus among the entire Burundian political class; and
c) organising a public debate about the eligibility of the current president.
4. Establish a tripartite committee (government officials, civil society representatives and foreign partners), following the conclusions of the nationwide consultations on transitional justice, to review the bill on the truth and reconciliation commission; and ensure that the elections timetable does not collide with that of the commission.
5. Establish a constitutional review committee composed of civil society representatives, politicians from all sides and, if needed, international experts.
To Civil Society and the Media:
6. Create a warning system and a legal assistance fund in case of threats and prosecutions against journalists and civil society activists.
To the International Community and, in particular, the U.S., the UN office in Burundi and the European Union (and all the European countries represented in Bujumbura):
7. Defend press freedom by:
a) supporting publicly the abolition of press offences during the public debate related to the new draft bill on the media;
b) providing technical and financial support for the nationwide extension of media coverage and offering training programs for the Burundian media; and
c) promoting quality work in the media through awards for the best journalists.
8. Organise a roundtable with the ruling party and the main opposition parties in order to define a consensual roadmap for the 2015 elections.
9. Support the warning system and contribute to the legal assistance fund to respond to threats and prosecutions against journalists and civil society activists.
10. Support the legal assistance program of the independent human rights commission and provide training for its personnel.
11. Focus the security sector reform (SSR) on human rights by:
a) using human rights indicators in the assessment methodology of the reform;
b) prioritising support for effective internal and external checks and balances in SSR programs; and
c) ensure financial support for the SSR is commensurate with progress on human rights and democratic control of the security services.
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The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Within a decade, the Gulf of Guinea has become one of the most dangerous maritime areas in the world. Maritime insecurity is a major regional problem that is compromising the development of this strategic economic area and threatening maritime trade in the short term and the stability of coastal states in the long term. Initially taken by surprise, the region’s governments are now aware of the problem and the UN is organising a summit meeting on the issue. In order to avoid violent transnational crime destabilising the maritime economy and coastal states, as it has done on the East African coast, these states must fill the security vacuum in their territorial waters and provide a collective response to this danger. Gulf of Guinea countries must press for dynamic cooperation between the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), take the initiative in promoting security and adopt a new approach based on improving not only security but also economic governance.
The recent discovery of offshore hydrocarbon deposits has increased the geostrategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea. After long neglecting their maritime zones, Gulf of Guinea states are now aware of their weakness. On the international front, renewed Western interest in the region is accompanied by similar interest from emerging nations. In this context, the rise in maritime crime has increased collective concern in a region where, for decades, the problems of sovereignty and territorial control have only been posed on dry land.
The Niger delta region in Nigeria was the initial epicentre of maritime crime. For decades, oil production has paradoxically created poverty. As social tensions and environmental pollution increased, oil income has, in large part, only benefited central government, oil companies and local elites. Those excluded from the system turned to violent opposition. Forced to bypass the state to gain access to even a fraction of this wealth, they have organised illegal activities, including siphoning off crude oil, clandestine refining and illegal trade in fuel. The constant increase in the value of the industry has allowed these activities to prosper and economic crime to spread.
The weakness and general inadequacy of the maritime policies of Gulf of Guinea states and the lack of cooperation between them have allowed criminal networks to diversify their activities and gradually extend them away from the Nigerian coast and out on to the high seas. Crime does not affect only the oil industry; it has diversified to include piracy and increasingly audacious and well-planned sea-borne raids. Criminal groups have learned quickly and appeared along the coasts of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipé, Benin and Togo, taking advantage of troubled socio-political situations.
Having recovered from the initial surprise, Gulf of Guinea states and Western countries are exploring how best to deal with the problem before it causes wider instability. States and regional organisations have launched specific operations and are formulating strategies to improve security. Those states most affected aim to build navies and increase resources for coastal policing in the hope of deterring criminals.
At the regional level, within the framework of its peace and security polices, ECCAS has created a regional maritime security centre and organised joint training exercises. However, states do not find it straightforward to organise joint funding or coordinate their efforts. Maritime policies are embryonic and symbolic and states are unable to maintain a continuous presence at sea. In the case of ECOWAS, maritime cooperation is still in its infancy and is hampered by political tensions and distrust of neighbouring states toward Nigeria.
At the inter-regional level, cooperation between ECCAS and ECOWAS would allow regional patrols to exercise the right of pursuit beyond maritime borders. However, inter-regional discussions have only just begun and political tensions hamper efforts to promote practical cooperation. Meanwhile, Western powers (U.S., France, U.K.) and emerging nations (Brazil, China, India, South Africa) with economic interests in the region are providing financial support and security expertise to assist local initiatives.
The institutionalisation of regional cooperation and the increase in the number of international initiatives must not obscure the fact that rising crime in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly due to poor governance. Most states in the region have been unable to control economic activities in their maritime zones and in international waters and ensure the development of their coasts. This collective failure has created a major opportunity for criminal networks that feed on the needs and resentments of local communities. A range of urgent measures is needed to reverse this trend: reforms to improve governance of the economy and security sector, comprehensive and effective maritime public policies and practical regional cooperation beyond declarations of intent. A long-term response is needed because, although piracy is a recent phenomenon in the region, its root causes are much deeper.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Governments of the Gulf of Guinea States (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipé, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola):
1. Prioritise the fight against maritime crime by creating an inter-ministerial committee in each country to draw up a national maritime strategy to tackle the immediate threat and the root causes of the problem. These committees should include at least the ministers of social affairs, foreign affairs, defence, interior, transport, economy, labour, fishing and natural resources.
To combat the root causes of maritime crime
2. Combat crime in the hydrocarbons and shipping sectors by conducting research into the illegal trade in fuel in order to identify the companies involved in illegal activities.
3. Boost job creation along the coast, in particular by protecting artisanal fishing, stimulating the local fish processing industry, providing professional training for vulnerable sectors of the population (former combatants and unemployed youth) and reinvesting assets seized from fuel smugglers in development projects.
4. Strengthen maritime law enforcement through professionalisation of naval forces, maritime law enforcement bodies and port authorities, which should increase their technological capacity and intelligence networks to monitor all activity in their exclusive economic zones.
To strengthen anti-piracy policies at sea and on land
5. Maintain navy patrols in mooring zones and territorial waters day and night and carry out regular surveillance flights.
6. Work closely with the UN’s International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and shipping industry to draw up best management practices advising ship owners, captains and crews on anti-piracy measures.
7. Set up a national inter-agency anti-piracy task force to investigate, arrest and prosecute pirate gangs on land and at sea.
8. Accede to all necessary international legal instruments including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, integrate these conventions into national law and train personnel responsible for implementing them, especially in the judicial system.
To strengthen cooperation
9. Sign bilateral agreements at the presidential level between direct neighbours to facilitate extraditions and enable close cooperation between navies, maritime administration agencies and police forces in counter-piracy work.
10. Organise in the near future joint surveillance operations in especially dangerous zones:
a) Nigeria, Benin and Togo should agree to expand the joint Operation Prosperity to include Togo’s territorial waters;
b) Nigeria and Cameroon should conduct joint patrols on their maritime borders.
11. Participate fully in efforts by ECCAS and ECOWAS to draw up a regional maritime security strategy and share resources.
12. Strengthen inter-regional cooperation by:
a) organising a Gulf of Guinea summit at which heads of state should sign the Memorandum of Understanding between ECCAS and ECOWAS on Maritime Security in the Central and Western Maritime Region and the Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation to Suppress Illicit Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa; and
b) making the Maritime Trade Information Sharing Centre (MTISC) to be set up in Ghana an information collection and dissemination tool for the Gulf of Guinea and transforming the regional training service for maritime security planned by ECCAS into a training centre for the whole region.
To International Partners:
13. Coordinate international support through a multinational maritime affairs committee for each country and ensure that foreign interventions are aligned with national strategies.
14. Assist national maritime affairs committees in designing comprehensive maritime policies that address the immediate threat and root causes of maritime crime; and support coastal states in their efforts to create jobs.
15. Impress upon Gulf of Guinea states the need to treat piracy as a transnational organised crime that demands a coordinated response including naval operations, investigative police work and prosecution of suspects; and design programmes to strengthen the capacities of all maritime law enforcement agencies.
To the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Interpol:
16. Advise and assist with tracking financial flows to Gulf of Guinea states as part of investigations into pirate organisations and the smuggling of hydrocarbons.
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Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU’s Lost Rebellion
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OVERVIEW
The Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (Forces démocratiques alliées-Armée nationale de libération de l’Ouganda, ADF-NALU) is one of the oldest but least known armed groups in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the only one in the area to be considered an Islamist terrorist organisation. Although it does not represent the same destabilising threat as the 23 March Movement (M23), it has managed to stand its ground against the Congolese army since 2010. Created in the DRC in 1995 and located in the mountainous DRC-Uganda border area, this Congolese-Ugandan armed group has shown remarkable resilience attributable to its geostrategic position, its successful integration into the cross-border economy and corruption in the security forces. Therefore, before considering any further military action against the ADF-NALU, it would be wise to separate fiction from fact and instead pursue a course of weakening its socio-economic base while at the same time offering a demobilisation and reintegration program to its combatants.
Formed of an alliance of several armed groups supported by external actors (Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire and Hassan al-Turabi’s Sudan), the ADF-NALU initially fought the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni. However, despite its Ugandan origins, it never managed to gain a foothold in its own country and instead settled in eastern Congo, particularly in the remote mountainous border areas. There it became integrated into local communities, participated in cross-border trade and forged relationships with various armed groups in eastern Congo as well as with both Congolese and Ugandan civilian and military authorities. Given their location in this “grey zone”, the ADF-NALU’s lost combatants have been able to survive despite not winning a battle in over fifteen years and having been defeated several times, but never neutralised.
Due to the ADF-NALU’s leader, Jamil Mukulu, a Christian convert to Islam, the group has transformed from a purely Congolese-Ugandan problem into one with regional dimensions, as a component of the trend of radical Islamism in East Africa. However, little is known about such purported links between ADF-NALU and radical Islamist organisations in the region and the group’s allegiance to Islamism seems rather superficial.
The fight against armed groups in eastern Congo continues to be viewed through a military lens, but it would be wise to avoid another ineffective military operation. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the UN, the DRC and Uganda should therefore adopt a different approach that seeks to:
Formulate an intelligence-based strategy to neutralise the ADF-NALU’s cross-border economic and logistical networks. The officers of the Joint Verification Mechanism deployed by the ICGLR in 2012 should work with the UN group of experts to produce a detailed study of these networks and use it to define an appropriate strategy for undermining the armed group’s economic and logistical base. Include the leaders of ADF-NALU’s support networks, inside and outside the DRC, on the list of individuals subject to UN sanctions for their support of armed groups. Congolese and Ugandan military personnel colluding with these networks should be dealt with appropriately by the authorities of their country.Rotate on a regular basis Congolese and Ugandan officers deployed in this region.Introduce a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for Congolese and Ugandan combatants who after investigation are found not to be responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. MONUSCO should appeal to donors to fund the program for Congolese ADF-NALU combatants. Authorise villagers in the Erengeti and Oïcha areas to resume work on their farms, which was suspended by the military authorities.agen bola
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Restart
The Central African Republic has a long history of crises, but the way the most recent one was managed indicates that a new security constellation may be emerging in the region.
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The Central African Republic (CAR) has always been a fragile state. The country has seen only five elections, but many coups. With armed rebels once more attacking the government in recent months, one might be tempted to think everything is business as usual in the CAR. That would, however, be the wrong analysis.
It is true, of course, that earlier crises unfolded in a similar way. President François Bozizé has been in power for ten years now, just like his predecessor Félix-Ange Patassé was in 2003, when Bozizé toppled him. Armed gangs are in control of large parts of the country today, as much as they were in 2003, and economic marginalisation is getting worse. And just like in 2003, the current rebellion appears to have been planned from outside the country. In addition, like in the past, France still has several hundred soldiers in the country.
Nonetheless, this is not 2003 all over again. Some experts are already speaking of a new security constellation in the region. Indeed, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is the peace broker in this crisis, and a new regional leadership is emerging.
The members of the ECCAS have played the main role in this crisis. They successfully mediated between the rebels and the government, and they negotiated the ceasefire. Idriss Déby and Sassou Nguesso, the presidents of Chad and the Republic of Congo respectively, have taken the place of Gabon’s late Omar Bongo, who had been central to regional mediation. Déby and Nguesso orchestrated talks in Libreville and achieved results in record time: in a mere four days, an agreement was debated, drafted and signed between Bozizé and the rebels.
Moreover, a new military actor is now on the scene. Precisely when the French president denied the Central African government the assistance it asked for, South Africa renewed its security agreement with the country and sent 400 troops. For the first time, the South African military has thus ventured beyond southern Africa and the Great Lakes region into an area where it arguably has no immediate strategic interests.
Such action is in line with the continent’s aspirations to have Africans resolve African problems. But coordination between the African peacemakers remains problematic. Pretoria neither took part in the Libreville talks, nor does it seem to have coordinated its military deployment with the ECCAS. However, the Libreville agreement points out that “the members of ECCAS will cooperate with the Central African government to make all foreign troops that do not belong to ECCAS gradually withdraw from the country’s territory depending on the security situation”.
The Libreville agreement has the potential to usher in a time of transition for the Central African Republic. The government of Prime Minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra resigned on 12 January, and the new Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, who was drawn from the opposition, was appointed on 17 January. He will have to arrange an early legislative election, restore peace and security and start crucial social, economic and security reforms before the 2016 presidential election.
For the transition to succeed, those unhappy with the Libreville agreement, such as some commanders of the rebellion and some dignitaries of the Bozizé regime, must be brought on board. The ECCAS will have to monitor developments diligently: its peace consolidation mission (MICOPAX) is already deployed in the Central African Republic, and it is foreseeable that its mandate will have to be reviewed and extended.
The most important thing, however, is that all relevant actors, whether from the Central African Republic or other countries, must learn the lessons of past crises instead of repeating past mistakes. The Central African Republic does not need business as usual under a new government. It needs a new consensus on development, nation and state building.
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Neustart
Die Zentralafrikanische Republik kennzeichnet eine lange Geschichte der Instabilität. Wie die jüngste Krise gehandhabt wurde, deutet indessen auf eine neue sicherheitspolitische Konstellation hin.
Die Zentralafrikanische Republik ist seit jeher politisch instabil: mehrere Staatsstreiche hat das Land erlebt, aber nur fünf politische Wahlen. Und wieder einmal greifen bewaffnete Rebellen die Regierung an. Fast scheint es so, als handele es sich hier um das übliche Szenario. Doch dies könnte ein Trugschluss sein.
Es stimmt, dass sich frühere Aufstände ähnlich gestalteten. Präsident François Bozizé ist seit zehn Jahren an der Macht, genauso wie 2003 sein Vorgänger Félix-Ange Patassé, als Bozizé ihn stürzte. Bewaffnete Gruppen kontrollieren immer noch einen Großteil des Landes und die wirtschaftliche Ausgrenzung nimmt zu. Wie bereits 2003 scheint die Rebellion auch diesmal von außen beeinflusst zu sein. Darüber hinaus hat Frankreich nach wie vor mehrere Hundert Soldaten im Land stationiert.
Dennoch: Es handelt sich hier nicht um das gleiche Szenario wie 2003. Experten sprechen bereits von einer sicherheitspolitischen Neuverteilung in der Region. Tatsächlich deutet es auf einen regionalen Führungswechsel hin, dass die Länder der Zentralafrikanischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (CEEAC) diesmal als Friedensstifter auftreten.
Sie spielten eine herausragende Rolle in der Krise. Mit Erfolg vermittelten sie einen Waffenstillstand zwischen den Rebellen und der Regierung. Idriss Déby und Sassou Ngueso, die Präsidenten von Tschad und der Republik Kongo, nehmen nun den Platz von Omar Bongo ein, dem ehemaligen Präsidenten Gabuns und zentralen Vermittler in der Region. Bei Friedensgesprächen in Libreville erzielten sie Ergebnisse in Rekordzeit. In nur vier Tagen hatten sie eine Einigung zwischen Bozizé und den Rebellen erreicht und unterschrieben zu Papier gebracht.
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Darüber hinaus erscheint jetzt ein neuer militärischer Akteur auf der Bildfläche: Südafrika erneuerte sein Sicherheitsabkommen mit der Zentralafrikanischen Republik in dem Moment, als Frankreichs Präsident der Republik die erbetene Hilfe verweigerte. Südafrika entsandte 400 Soldaten. Damit wagt sich das Land zum ersten Mal militärisch aus dem südlichen Afrika und der Große-Seen-Region hinaus und in einen Teil des Kontinents, in dem es keine strategischen Interessen hat. Darin zeigen sich die Bestrebungen Afrikas, seine Probleme selbst zu lösen. Nur die Abstimmung zwischen den afrikanischen Friedensstiftern bleibt problematisch. Pretoria nahm zum Beispiel weder an den Friedensgesprächen in Libreville teil, noch scheint es seine militärische Beteiligung mit den CEEAC-Mitgliedsstaaten abgesprochen zu haben. Im Libreville-Abkommen steht aber, dass „die Mitgliedsstaaten der CEEAC gemeinsam mit der zentralafrikanischen Regierung dafür Sorge tragen, dass alle ausländischen Truppen, die nicht zur CEEAC gehören, schrittweise aus dem Gebiet abgezogen werden, so es die Sicherheitslage zulässt“.
Dem Libreville-Abkommen ist zuzutrauen, dass es einen Umbruch in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik mit sich bringt. Die Regierung unter Premierminister Faustin-Archange Touadéra legte am 12. Januar ihr Amt nieder, und der neue Premier und Mitglied der Opposition, Nicolas Tiangaye, wurde am 17. Januar eingeschworen. Dieser wird sowohl eine vorgezogene Neuwahl organisieren müssen, als auch Frieden und Sicherheit wieder herstellen. Darüber hinaus stehen Wirtschafts- und Sicherheitsreformen an, und all dies noch vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen 2016.
Für einen erfolgreichen Wechsel müssen aber besonders jene ins Boot geholt werden, die sich durch das Libreville-Abkommen benachteiligt fühlen – so zum Beispiel Rebellenführer und ehemalige Würdenträger des Bozizé Regimes. Zudem muss die CEEAC die Entwicklung der Lage genauestens beobachten. Ihre Mission zur Konsolidierung des Friedens (MICOPAX) ist bereits in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik angekommen und ihr Mandat hat Aussicht auf Verlängerung.
Nun ist es wichtig, dass alle Akteure – zentralafrikanische sowie ausländische – aus den Fehlern der Vergangenheit lernen. Das letzte was die Zentralafrikanische Regierung jetzt braucht, ist das übliche Prozedere der letzen Jahre. Stattdessen ist Einstimmigkeit gefragt – für die Entwicklung von Staat und Nation.
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Central African Republic: Better Late than Never
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Over nine months, the weak Central African Republic (CAR) state has collapsed, triggering a serious humanitarian crisis, with 400,000 displaced and nearly half the population in need of assistance. The transition government and the regional security force have failed to prevent a descent into chaos in urban areas, in particular Bangui, as well as in the countryside. After months of “wait-and-see” and following deadly clashes, the international community now realises it cannot afford another collapsed state in Africa. Unfortunately, the situation on the ground is deteriorating at a much faster pace than the international mobilisation, and Bangui is vulnerable to a total breakdown in law and order. The UN Security Council should immediately provide a Chapter VII mandate to the new African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA), supported by French troops, to launch an operation to secure Bangui that should then be extended to other cities. Subsequently, religious reconciliation should be prioritised and stabilisation measures adopted.
The risk of the CAR becoming ungovernable that Crisis Group highlighted in June 2013 is now real. The Seleka, a loose coalition of armed groups that took power in a March 2013 coup, has broken up into multiple armed factions, whose thuggery has triggered violent reactions among the population. Further, the conflict has taken on a religious undercurrent between the predominantly Muslim Seleka and Christian self-defence groups.
The CAR faces a number of major challenges: in the short term, restoring law and order and providing immediate humanitarian aid; in the medium term, ensuring that the eighteen-month transition agreed to by the Seleka leaders and other political actors is managed in an effective and sustainable manner; and in the long term, rebuilding the state. Successful transition and reconstruction can only be achieved if minimum security conditions are met. Instability has already spilled over the Cameroon border, and the combination of religious tensions and powerless transitional authorities is the perfect recipe for further deadly clashes between local populations and the various Seleka factions, especially in Bangui.
The current stabilisation effort (deployment of an African Union peacekeeping mission, made up of troops from a 2008 mission) is not working. Following the UN’s technical assessment mission in October 2013 and France’s recent decision to increase its troops in Bangui, there is a growing consensus that a more robust, better-resourced emergency response is needed. The UN Security Council is preparing a resolution that needs to be adopted promptly.
Concurrently, the following short-term measures are required:
The Security Council should authorise, under a UN Chapter VII (obligatory on all member states) resolution, MISCA, supported by French forces, to take all necessary means to help stabilise the situation. Its immediate and primary focus should be on restoring law and order, protecting civilians, providing humanitarian relief and documenting human rights abuses. Other countries should also provide logistical (including transportation) and intelligence support in coordination with France and the African Union.The AU-led forces under MISCA and French forces already on the ground should be reinforced immediately, and together with the very few effective national security forces, should restore law and order in Bangui, including by establishing control of all roads into and out of the city; and helping elements of the national police that have already returned to some police stations previously occupied by Seleka fighters.Once Bangui is secured, the AU-led forces under MISCA and the French should deploy to where fighting between Seleka and self-defence groups is occurring and where tension between Christians and Muslims is high. They should also secure the major routes, such as that connecting Bangui with the Cameroon border.The Security Council, after adopting the Chapter VII resolution, should work to ensure the rapid provision of additional resources – including logistics and the requisite capabilities to conduct night patrols – to ensure MISCA has full operational capacity. Simultaneously, the AU and EU should quickly agree on funding for the salaries of MISCA troops.The following mid-term measures are then required:The UN and donors should support inter-religious dialogue and implement urgent reconstruction projects, particularly in cities where fighting has occurred and where Christians and Muslims are living separately.Other priorities are to launch the first phase – gathering and disarming – of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for Seleka combatants; to establish a team to investigate the plundering of natural resources; to support the mixed commission of inquiry set up by the transitional authorities; and to quickly deploy local reconstruction teams.
The Security Council should continue to follow the CAR situation closely, and give serious consideration to transition MISCA into an enhanced UN-led multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation when necessary and appropriate. Improving security in the capital and in the worst-affected provinces, returning to normalcy in the main cities and resuming road traffic and trade between Bangui and the provinces could pave the way for a successful transition in the medium term. For this to happen, as Crisis Group’s June report recommended, a number of other steps remain relevant, among them the dispatch of a UN electoral assessment mission, security sector reform and public finance reform. But this is not today’s concern: as CAR stares into an abyss of potentially appalling proportions, the focus must remain squarely on the quickest, most decisive means of restoring security.
Nairobi/Brussels, 2 December 2013
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